2009-VIL-338-ITAT-JDP

Equivalent Citation: TTJ 124, 674,

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal JODHPUR

IT APPEAL NOS. 586 TO 588 (JD.) OF 2008

Date: 19.08.2009

SUNCITY ALLOYS (P) LTD. & OTHERS

Vs

ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX.

BENCH

Member(s)  : B. R. JAIN., K. S. S. PRASADA RAO.

JUDGMENT

In all the eleven appeals by M/s Suncity Metals (P) Ltd., M/s Suncity Alloys (P) Ltd. and Jay Steels (India), identical grounds raised in all the years are as under:

"1. The impugned order passed by the learned CIT(A) and the AO is contrary to the provisions of law and against all cannons of natural justice and is also contrary to facts, material and evidence existing on records.

2. The learned CIT(A) has erred in holding that the ground relating to non-taxability of sales-tax incentive cannot be entertained in the proceedings under s. 153A of the IT Act and has further erred in holding that such a claim can, be made only by filing a revised return under s. 139. The refusal to entertain such a claim in the proceedings under s. 153A is patently illegal, invalid and most unjustified.

3. That under the facts and circumstances of the appellant's case, the learned CIT(A) ought to have entertained the claim relating to non-taxability of the amount of sales-tax incentives and also ought to have held that the amount of sales-tax incentives is a capital receipt not liable to tax.

2. Briefly the facts are that an action under s. 132 of the IT Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as 'Act' was taken at various business premises and residences of directors/partners of the companies/firms on 20th Feb., 2004. By a notification dt. 8th June, 2004, all these cases were centralized with the AO, Central Circle-1, Jodhpur. The same was communicated to these assessees on 23rd June, 2004. Notices under s. 153A(a) of the Act were issued on 5th Oct., 2004 requiring these asses sees to file return of income within 35 days of the receipt of notice which was served on them on 12th Oct., 2004. In compliance thereto, the returns declaring nil income from the manufacture of stainless steel sheets were filed belatedly on 7th April, 2005.

3. In the returns of income filed in response to notices under s. 153A of the Act, all these assessees claimed deduction of sales-tax incentive on the premise that the incentive so received being granted with an object to promote industrial growth or expansion, will be a capital receipt. Reliance was placed to a judgment rendered by the Special Bench of the Tribunal in Dy. CIT vs. Reliance Industries Ltd. (2004) 82 TTJ (Mumbai) (SB) 765 : (2004) 88 ITD 273 (Mumbai)(SB). As the incentive was granted under the sales-tax scheme, the assessees also filed copies of sales-tax assessments showing working of eligible incentive under that scheme.

4. The assessing authority primarily declined to accept such a claim as the asses sees had made no such claim in the returns of income filed originally under s. 139 of the Act. He was of the view that returns of income filed in response to notice under s. 153A of the Act are as a consequence of action taken under s. 132 of the Act on these assessees. These proceedings are analogous to proceedings under s. 147 of the Act to the extent that these are proceedings for the benefit of Revenue and not that of the assessee. The assessee cannot be permitted, to convert these reassessment proceedings as his appeal or revision in disguise and seek relief in respect of items earlier not claimed in the original return of income. Reliance was placed to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in K. Sudhakar S. Shanbhag vs. ITO (2000) 161 CTR (Bom) 391 : (2000) 241 ITR 865 (Bom) which was rendered by taking notice of the principle laid by the Hon'ble apex Court in CIT vs. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. (1992) 107 CTR (SC) 209 : (1992) 198 ITR 297 (SC) to the effect that in reassessment proceedings, an assessee can neither claim nor be allowed a deduction that was not claimed in the original return. As such, it was held that the assessment proceedings initiated on the basis of an action under s. 132 of the Act also cannot be utilised by the assessee to seek relief not claimed earlier.

5. The AO also found that the assessee has already got a remission by way of an exemption from sales-tax and as such there remains no ground from claiming notional sales-tax liability as its capital receipt and thereby exemption of the amount from the income. The IT Act does not warrant to bestow double benefit of the same amount. Notwithstanding that, the cost incurred for plant and machinery shall have to be reduced to the extent of amount of sales-tax incentive so that the necessary consequence of reduced depreciation allowance can follow. Accordingly the assessments in all these cases have been completed at a total nil income with direction to carry forward the unabsorbed depreciation to be set off against income of subsequent years wherever available. In the case of M/s Jay Steels (India), the total income of Rs. 13,495 for asst. yr. 2001-02 and Rs. 81,780 for asst. yr. 2002-03 have been assessed.

6. While assailing these assessments in appeal before the learned CIT(A), the appellants stated that assessments for the year under consideration had already been completed under s. 143 of the Act. Such assessments cannot be disturbed. The second proviso below s. 153A of the Act speaks about pending assessments alone that are abated. In the proceedings under s. 153A of the Act. all the legal and factual claims can also validly be made regardless of the fact that such claims were not made in the original return filed under s. 139 of the Act. Accordingly the assessee's claim for grant of deduction/exemption against the sales-tax incentive needs to be allowed.

7. The learned CIT(A) found that the appellants neither made any such claim in the original return filed under s. 139(1) of the Act nor in regular assessment proceedings by way of filing any revised return. Returns filed in response to notice under s. 153A of the Act are not substitute of revised return for making claim of such benefits. Reliance was placed on the Hon'ble apex Court judgment in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd. vs. CIT (2006) 204 CTR (SC) 182 : (2006) 284 ITR 323 (SC) wherein it has been laid that the AO cannot entertain a claim for deduction otherwise than by filing a revised return. He, therefore, upheld that the claim of sales-tax incentive as capital receipt without filing revised return cannot be entertained. He also upheld the order to deny deduction in all the years under consideration.

8. The appellants carried the dispute before the Tribunal on the grounds aforesaid. Shri Kothari, learned counsel for the appellant makes a plea that after initiation of action under s. 153A of the Act, proceedings or returns filed under s. 139 or 147 of the Act stand abated. Further that the assessments for six years made or pending shall also abate. Thus the proceedings under s. 153A are de novo assessment proceedings wherein the assessee can make all fresh claims for grant of exemptions and deductions in any return of income furnished pursuant to notice under s. 153A of the Act.

9. Shri Narendra Gaur, learned CIT-Departmental Representative for Revenue objecting to the claim of the appellant, contends that the interpretation of law should not only be logical and rational in nature but should also be harmonious and understood in a manner which satisfies the prime objective and intention of legislation. Relevant principles on interpretation have been stated in the following case laws:

(i) Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation vs. CIT (1997) 142 CTR (SC) 181 : (1997) 227 ITR 414 (SC);

(ii) Oxford University Press vs. CIT (2001) 165 CTR (SC) 629 : (2001) 247 ITR 658 (SC);

(iii) C.W.S. (India) Ltd. vs. CIT (1994) 118 CTR (SC) 118 : (1994) 208 ITR 649 (SC);

(iv) K.P. Varghese vs. ITO (1981) 24 CTR (SC) 358 : (1981) 131 ITR 597 (SC).

Since Chapter XIV-B has been replaced by new provisions of ss. 153A to 153C, the object of legislation is to assess undisclosed income. New clauses (sic-claims) of deduction or exemption cannot be allowed to such searched persons. If it is so allowed, then the same shall become discriminatory to the other regular assessees who have lost a right as such to claim deduction by efflux of time or by mandate of the Act.

10. The parties have been heard with reference to precedents cited at Bar, written submissions and material placed on record in terms of sub-r. (6) of r. 18 of ITAT Rules, 1963 that reads as under:

"Documents that are referred to and relied upon by the parties during the course of arguments shall alone be treated as part of the record of the Tribunal."

11. Three new ss. 153A, 153B and 153C have been inserted by the Finance Act, 2003 to provide for assessment in case of search or requisition. The provisions of s. 153A of the Act that are relevant to controversy raised in these appeals are reproduced hereunder:

"Notwithstanding anything contained in s. 139, s. 147, s. 148, s. 149, s. 151 and s. 153, in the case of a person where a search is initiated under s. 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets are requisitioned under s. 132A after the 31st day of May, 2003 the AO shall-

(a) issue notice to such person requiring him to furnish within such period as may be specified in the notice, the return of income in respect of each assessment year falling within six assessment years referred to in cl. (b) in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if such return were a return required to be furnished under s. 139;

(b) assess or reassess the total income of six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which such search is conducted or requisition is made:

Provided that the AO shall assess or reassess the total income in respect of each assessment year falling within such six assessment years:

Provided further that assessment or reassessment, if any, relating to any assessment year falling within the period of six assessment years referred to in this section pending on the date of initiation of the search under s. 132 or making of requisition under s. 132, as the case may be, shall abate.

Explanation-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that-

(i) save as otherwise provided in this section, s. 153B and s. 153C all other provisions of this Act shall apply to the assessment made under this section;

(ii) in an assessment or reassessment made in respect of an assessment year under this section, the tax shall be chargeable at the rate or rates as applicable to such assessment year."

12. The Finance Act, 2003 has also inserted a new provision as s. 158BI, which provides that Chapter XIV-B containing special procedure for assessment of search cases shall not apply after certain date. The provision reads as under:

"The provisions of this chapter shall not apply where a search is initiated under s. 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets are requisitioned under s. 132A after the 31st day of May 2003."

13. Thereafter, the scope and effect of the insertion of a new s. 153A of the Act by the Finance Act, 2003 have been elaborated by the CBDT in the following portion of the Departmental Circular No. 7 of 2003, dt. 5th Sept., 2003 [(2003) 184 CTR (St) 33]:

"65. The special procedure for assessment of search cases under Chapter XIV-B be abolished

65.1 The existing provisions of the Chapter XIV-B provide for a single assessment of undisclosed income of block period, which means the period comprising previous years relevant to six assessment years preceding the preceding year in which the search was conducted and also includes the period upto the date of the commencement of such search and lay down the manner in which such income is to be computed.

65.2 The Finance Act, 2003 has provided that the provisions of this chapter shall not apply where a search is initiated under s. 132, or books of account, other documents or any assets are requisitioned under s. 132A after 31st May, 2003 by inserting a new s. 158BI in the IT Act.

65.3 Further, three new ss. 153A, 153B and 153C have been inserted in the IT Act to provide for assessment in case of search or making requisition.

65.4 The new s. 153A provides the procedure for completion of assessment where a search is initiated under s. 132 or books of account or other documents or any assets are requisitioned under s. 132A after 31st May, 2003. In such case, the AO shall issue notice to such person requiring him to furnish, within such period as may be specified in the notice, return of income in respect of six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted under s. 132 or requisition was made under s. 132A.

65.5 The AO shall assess or reassess the total income of each of these six assessment years. Assessment or reassessment, if any, relating to any assessment year, falling within the period of six assessment years pending on the date of initiation of the search under s. 132 or requisition under s. 132A, as the case may be, shall abate. It is clarified that the appeal, revision or rectification proceedings pending on the date of initiation of search under s. 132 or requisition shall not abate. Save as otherwise provided in the proposed s. 153A, s. 153B and s. 153C, all other provisions of this Act shall apply to the assessment or reassessment made under s. 153A. It is also clarified that assessment or reassessment made under s. 153A shall be subject to interest, penalty and prosecution, if applicable. In the assessment or reassessment made in respect of an assessment year under this section, the tax shall be chargeable at the rate or rates as applicable to such assessment year.

65.6 The new s. 153B provides for the time-limit for completion of search assessments. It provides that the AO shall make an order of assessment or reassessment in respect of each assessment year, falling within six assessment years under s. 153A within a period of two years from the end of the financial year in which the last of the authorizations for search under s. 132 or for requisition under s. 132A was executed.

65.7 This section also provides that assessment in respect of the assessment year relevant to the preceding year in which the search is conducted under s. 132 or requisition is made under s. 132A shall be completed within a period of two years from the end of the financial year in which the last of the authorizations for search under s. 132 or for requisition under s. 132A as the case may be, was executed.

65.8 It also provides that in computing the period of limitation for completion of such assessment or reassessment, the period during which the assessment proceedings is stayed by an order or injunction of any Court; or the period commencing from the day on which the AO directed the assessee to get his accounts audited under s. (2A) of s. 142 and ending on the day on which the assessee is required to furnish report of such audit under that sub-section, or the time taken in reopening the whole or any part of the proceeding or giving an opportunity to the assessee of being reheard under the proviso to s. 129 or in a case where an application made before the Settlement Commission under s. 245C is rejected by it or is not allowed to be proceeded with by it, the period commencing on the date on which such application is made and ending with the date on which the order under sub-s. (1) of s. 245D is received by the CIT under sub-so 20 of that section, shall be excluded. If, after the exclusion of the aforesaid period, the period of limitation available to the AO for making an order of assessment or reassessment as the case may be, is less than sixty days, such remaining period shall be extended to sixty days and the period of limitation shall be deemed to be extended accordingly.

65.9 The new s. 153C provides that where an AO is satisfied that any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing or books of account or documents seized or requisitioned belong or belongs to a person other than the person referred to in s. 153A, then the books of account, or documents or assets seized or requisitioned shall be handed over to the AO having jurisdiction over such other person and that AO shall proceed against such other person and issue such other person notice and assess or reassess income of such other person in accordance with the provisions of s. 153A.

65.10 An appeal against the order of assessment or reassessment under s. 153A shall lie with the CIT(A).

65.11 Consequential amendments have also been made in ss. 132, 132B, 140A, 234A, 234B, 246A and 276CC to give reference to s. 153A in these sections.

65.12 These amendments will take effect from 1st June, 2003 [ss. 59(b), 60(b), 63, 65, 67, 89, 90, 93 and 97]."

14. From the reading of s. 153A of the Act, it is evident that this section starts with non obstante clause and overrides ss. 139, 147, 148,149, 151 and 153. It provides the procedure for assessment where a search is initiated under s. 132 of the Act or books of account or other documents or any assets are requisitioned under s. 132A of the Act. This section does not override the provisions contained under s. 143 of the Act. It makes imperative on the part of the AO to issue notice to such person requiring him to furnish, within such period, as may be specified in the notice, return of income in respect of each assessment year falling within six assessment years preceding the assessment year in which the search was conducted under s. 132 or requisition was made under s. 132A of the Act. It also mandates to assess or reassess the total income of six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which such search is conducted or requisition is made. Even though no notice is required to be issued to such person requiring him to furnish return in respect of assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted under s. 132 or requisition is made under s. 132A of the Act, s. 153B prescribes time-limit for completion of assessment in such cases also. By implication return of income for such period need to be furnished voluntarily by the assessee in the same manner as prescribed under s. 139 of the Act, whereas by mandate of the Act, the returns for six assessment years immediately preceding the year in which action under s. 132 has been taken, are to be furnished on demand by the assessing authority. The returns so demanded, therefore, are not voluntary returns.

15. Considering the submissions and upon the perusal of second proviso below s. 153A, it is also found clearly laid that the assessment or reassessments referred to in s. 153A of the Act that are pending on the date of initiation of search or making of requisition under s. 132A shall abate. The statute does not say that the assessment or reassessments that has already been made before the date as aforesaid shall also abate. It is also not correct that all the proceedings or returns filed shall also abate. In fact the assessing authority is the custodian of all such returns including the returns relatable to pending assessments that stand abated. Sub-s. (2) of s. 153A of the Act mandates that if any proceedings initiated or any order of assessment made under sub-s. (1) relating to any assessment year, which has been abated under second proviso to s. 153A, shall stand revived from the date of receipt of the order of such annulment by the CIT. This goes to show that the assessing authority cannot and shall not destroy such returns from his record. Furthermore, the proceedings that are supposed to be abated are in relation to assessment or reassessment to be made by the officer of original jurisdiction i.e., the AO and not all other proceedings such as appeal, revision or rectification, which are continuation of assessment or reassessment proceedings as is evident from the Board in its Circular No. 7 of 2003 dt. 5th Sept., 2003 reproduced hereinbefore. The appellant's reference to Hon'ble apex Court judgment in the case of S. Sankappa & Ors. vs. ITO (1968) 68 ITR 760 (SC) is also relevant to understand the concept of "pending assessment". The Hon'ble apex Court while defining assessment have laid that the word assessment is used in the IT Act in a number of provisions in a comprehensive sense and includes all proceedings, starting with the filing of return or issue of notice and ending with determination of the tax payable by the assessee. In this view, the assessment proceedings shall be understood to have commenced from the date of filing of return by an assessee. The assessments that shall have to be thus considered "pending" on the date of initiation of action under s. 132 shall be-

(i) where after filing of the return of income in accordance with provisions of s. 139 of the Act, the same is neither processed under s. 143(1)(a) nor a notice issued under s. 143(2) of the Act before the expiry of limitation period at the time when action under s. 132 of the Act has been initiated.

(ii) where a notice under s. 143(2) of the Act has been issued but the assessment by the AO has not been completed within the time prescribed under s. 153(1) of the Act.

16. According to mandate of s. 139(5) of the Act, the assessee has a statutory right to revise its return of income in the manner provided therein. An assessee filing return in response to notice under s. 153A shall also be eligible to make new claim of deduction or allowance in the case of pending assessments where time to revise returns has not expired. After the expiry of time available under s. 139(5) no such new claim of deduction or allowance can be made in such returns.

17. The expression 'assessment or reassessment' used in s. 153A of the Act connotes determination of total income pursuant to return required to be filed in the case of a person where a search is initiated under s. 132 or requisition is made under s. 132A of the Act. To such assessment or reassessment made all other provisions of this Act shall also apply as is spelled out in Expln. (i) below s. 153A. Explanation (ii) further clarifies the amount of tax chargeable in an assessment or reassessment in respect of an assessment under this section. It is thus amply clear that the expression 'assessment' or 'reassessment' used in this section have to be understood in the context of s. 153A of the Act alone. The word 'assessment' is used in a number of provisions in a comprehensive sense and it can comprehend the whole procedure for ascertaining and imposing liability upon the taxpayer and the machinery for enforcement thereof. The concept of expression 'assessment' used in the IT Act at different places with different connotations has been explained by the Hon'ble apex Court in G.A. Abraham vs. ITO (1961) 41 ITR 425 (SC), 429. The meaning to be assigned to the word 'assessment' has to be understood in each section with reference to the context in which it has been used as laid down by the Hon'ble apex Court in A.N. Lakshman Shenoy vs. ITO (l958) 34 ITR 275 (SC), 291. Thus in s. 153A the expression signifies merely computation of undisclosed income that shall form part of "total income" within the meaning of s. 2(45) of the Act in respect of each of the assessment falling within such six assessment years that is required to be aggregated with the income already assessed in cases of completed assessments, more so when s. 132 of the Act comprehends action to search of a person in possession of undisclosed income or property. In those cases where assessments are pending at the time of initiation of action under s. 132, the computation of total income has to be done in a normal manner. In our humble opinion, the computation of total income so made shall meet the requirement of s. 4 of the Act.

18. The judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Jharkhand High Court in the case of Abhay Kumar Shroff vs. CIT (2007) 210 CTR (Jharkhand) 602 : (2007) 290 ITR 114 (Jharkhand) relied by the appellants, also clearly states that after 31st May, 2003, the earlier provision of block assessment in the case of search initiated shall not apply. Instead, the provision that there shall be assessment on undisclosed income comprising of previous years relating to six assessment years preceding in which search, was conducted, shall apply. This supports the view we have entertained in the earlier para. Having regard to the provisions of s. 139(5) of the Act and since the assessments under s. 153A are in relation to undisclosed income, it is precisely for this reason that new claim of deduction or allowance cannot be made in the completed assessments. It is a settled principle of law that what cannot be done directly can also not be done indirectly. Reference may be had to the judgments rendered by Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Anupam Sushil Garg vs. CIT (2003) 185 CTR (All) 505 : (2004) 265 ITR 474 (All).

19. There is another reason for not agreeing with the appellant's plea that the assessment or reassessments of six years preceding to the year in which search is initiated and the assessment year in which search is initiated contemplates fresh assessment, is that the second proviso below s. 153A of the Act suspends only the pending assessment. The word 'abate' has not been defined in the Act. The Hon'ble High Court in Abhay Kumar Shroff vs. CIT has extracted the dictionary meaning of the said word as under:

"According to Chambers Dictionary, the word 'abate' means demolition or to put an end to. The Law Lexicon defines the word 'abate' which means to throw down, destroy or quash or nullify.

According to Blacks Law Dictionary the word 'abatement' means the act eliminating or nullifying or suspension or defeat of a pending action.

According to Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanathan Aiyar the word 'abate' means diminish or take away or put an end to or come to a naught. The term is used in USA to describe the cancellation in whole or in part of a Government levy."

20. Furthermore, in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edn. Vol. 4 at p. 1975, it is stated as under:

"A legal proceeding is 'pending' as soon as commenced and until it is concluded i.e., so long the long having original cognizance of it can make an order on the matters in issue or to be dealt with, therein.

The passage from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary was approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Asgarali Nazarali vs. State of Bombay AIR 1957 SC 503. At p. 509 of the report, Justice Bhagwati delivering the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court set out this definition of 'pending' legal proceeding and then observed."

Similar are the observations of Jessel M.R. in, In re Clagett's Estate Fordham vs. Clagett (1982) 20 Ch. D 637, 653 (CA):

"What is the meaning of the word 'pending'? In my opinion, it includes every insolvency in which any proceeding can by any possibility be taken. That I think is the meaning of the word 'pending'....... A cause is said to be pending in a Court of justice when any proceeding can be taken in it. 'That is the test'."

21. Thus the entire overthrow or destruction or termination of pending assessment before the assessing authority who can take original cognizance is only to avoid two parallel proceedings of assessment of a particular year of the same person, i.e., one as regular assessment and another as assessment under s. 153A of the Act and not that the whole exercise of assessment to be made afresh in respect of completed assessments.

22. The issuance of notice under s. 153A  for all the six assessment years also does not entail altogether a fresh exercise of making fresh assessment. In fact, the apparent and logical purpose of calling for returns for all the six assessment years immediately preceding the year in which search is initiated is to dispense with the requirement of recording reasons for reopening the assessment and also to avoid any controversy as to the correct year of assessibility of such income falling within such six assessment years. Necessarily the undisclosed income that shall form part of total income would be so taken after defraying for all expenses that are incurred for earning such income by the assessee. Reference to the principle laid in judgment rendered by apex Court in CIT vs. Piara Singh (1980) 17 CTR (SC) 111 : (1980) 124 ITR 40 (SC) is relevant.

23. We, therefore, find ourselves in agreement with the proposition made by the learned Departmental Representative that rules of interpretation so applied would not allow making of fresh claims as such. Principle of interpretation laid by Hon'ble apex Court in Poppatlal Shah vs. State of Madras AIR 1953 SC 274 reads as under:

"It is a settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent, all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase, or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself. The title and preamble, whatever their value might be as aids to the construction of a statute, undoubtedly throw light on the intent and design of the legislature and indicate the scope and purpose of the legislation itself."

24. Viewed in this manner and considering the scheme of the Act, it is apparent that s. 234B of the Act also mandates only the 'increase' in amount of interest pursuant to assessment under s. 153A of the Act. Sec. 240 of the Act does not entitle an assessee to claim refund of the tax paid in excess of the tax chargeable on the total income returned by the assessee in cases where assessments have already been completed but stand annulled. Sec. 139(5) of the Act stipulates time for revising return within one year from the end of the relevant assessment year or before the completion of the assessment whichever is earlier. Furthermore the original returns filed under s. 139 of the Act are relevant for imposing penalty in such cases. This all goes to show that the assessment or reassessment made pursuant to notice under s. 153A of the Act are not de novo assessments. We, therefore, find no merit in the ground raised in appeal to make a new claim of deduction or allowance as such where admittedly the regular assessments are shown as completed assessment on the date of initiation of action under s. 132 of the Act. Such a ground in all these appeals stands rejected.

25. Having rejected the ground in appeal as aforesaid, we do not consider it necessary to find out the applicability of the judgment rendered by Special Bench at Bombay Tribunal in the case of Dy. CIT vs. Reliance Industries Ltd. or express any opinion as to whether the sales-tax incentive is a capital or revenue receipt.

26. In the result, all the appeals stand dismissed.

 

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