1970-VIL-448-ITAT-CTK
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal CUTTACK
ITA No.418/CTK/2018
Date: 01.01.1970
REGIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
Vs
ACIT, TDS, BHUBANESWAR
JUDGMENT
PER L.P.SAHU, AM:
This appeal filed by the assessee against the order of CIT(A)-I, Bhubaneswar, dated 04.10.2011 for assessment year 2009-2010.
2. As per the office note, the appeal of the assessee is barred by 2554 days. In this regard, ld. AR has filed an application for condonation of delay stating therein as under :-
Before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack.
In the matter of |
REGIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION, BHUBANESWAR, SACHIVALAYA MARG, BHUBANESWAR-751022, Financial Year - 2008-09 (Asst. Year - 2009-2010) TAN - BBNR00302B |
|
AND |
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Application for condonation of delay in filing appeal. |
Sir,
The above named appellant, REGIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION, BHUBANESWAR, must humbly & respectfully sheweth:
1. That the order of the CIT (Appeals)-I, Bhubaneswar purported to have been passed referring to the Order framed U/s 201(1) & 201(1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, by the ACIT, (TDS), Bhubaneswar instituted on 16.02.2010 & Order was passed on 04/10/2011, was received by the REGIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION, BHUBANESWAR on dt.07/10/2011.
2. That if anybody aggrieved with such order, has to prefer an appeal within 60 days from the date of receipt of the order and as such the appeal was to be filed on or before Dated 06/12/2011.
3. That delay in filing the appeal is because of a genuine belief of the applicability of provisions of Rule 3 of the Income-tax Rules 1962 regarding the perquisite value of the accommodation provided by the appellant to its employees considering the status of the appellant at par with that of a Government Department, which was neither accepted by the Assessing Officer, ACIT, (TDS), Bhubaneswar nor accepted by the CIT (Appeals)-I, Bhubaneswar & Order was passed on 18/01/2010 by the Assessing Officer, ACIT, (TDS), Bhubaneswar, being aggrieved by the order of the Assessing Officer ACIT (TDS) filed an appeal against the order of the Assessing Officer before the Commissioner of Income-Tax(Appeals)-l,Bhubaneswar, the appeal was dismissed by CIT-(APPEAL)-l Bhubaneswar by his order Dated 04/10/2011. But on the same issue raised by Regional Institute of Education Mysore, on the question of fact that whether the employees of the appellant could be construed as the employees of the Central Government or any other State Government for the purpose of claiming the benefit of the perquisite value for un furnished accommodation, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) Mysore, has construed the status of the appellant as a Central Government Organization for the purpose of valuation of perquisites and not as an autonomous body vide Order Dated 31/08/2017 (copy attached). The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.
It may be stated here that "Any appeal or any application, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period". The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated, and refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause.
4. It may be stated here that Regional Institute of Education Mysore one of the other major constituent units of NCERT has raised objection against the order of the Assessing Officer (TDS) Mysore who took a view that status of the appellant could not be equated with that of a government department, Before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) Mysore, and the issue was addressed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals] Mysore vide Order Dated 31/08/2017 who has accepted the contention of the Appellant on the primary issue pertaining to a question of fact that whether the employees of the appellant could be construed as the employees of the Central Government or any other State Government for the purpose of claiming the benefit of the perquisite value for un furnished accommodation provided by the appellant to its employees & The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) Mysore, interpreting the facts of the case by applying the intelligible differentia provided by the law in this regard, has construed the status of the appellant as a Central Government Organization for the purpose of valuation of perquisites and not as an autonomous body as stated by the ITO(TDS]. Accordingly, the aforesaid primary issue contested in the Appeal was allowed vide order dated 31/08/2017.
Further when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Further rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties & if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. The object of providing this legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury.
5. That on receiving the order the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals] Mysore, the order was handed over to the Responsible Officer Mr JEETENDRA SINGH KSHETRY (ACCOUNTS OFFICER] for handing over the same to the Chartered Accountant, Mr. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, for comparing the issues and orders & for preparing the Grounds of Appeal/statement of facts, appeal, revision etc.
6. That the Chartered Accountant on going through the connected records/documents prepared the appeal memo, statement of facts and Grounds of Appeal and filed the appeal before the ITAT, Cuttack, Bench Cuttack on dated 07th Day of December, 2018.
7. That there is a delay in filing the appeal by 2554 days.
8. That the delay in filing of the appeal therefore was beyond the reasonable control of the appellant REGIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION Bhubaneswar.
9. That, ordinarily the appellant INSTITUTE does not stand to benefit entering into litigation by lodging an appeal late. In the instant case, there being a meritorious matter which could be thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated when the delay is not condoned, the delay in filing of the appeal being not deliberate, intentional be condoned to meet the end of substantial justice to the appellant.
10. That under the circumstances the appellant prays that no delay of which beyond the control of the appellant INSTITUTE and humbly prays that the delay may be condoned.
11. That the appellant INSTITUTE craves leave of this Hon'ble Court to amend and or urge any other ground at the time of hearing.
12. That a personal hearing may kindly be extended to the appellant INSTITUTE.
PRAYER
In the context aforesaid and on the facts and particular circumstances of the case, it is prayed before your honour that the delay in filing the appeal by 2554 days be condoned, otherwise the appellant INSTITUTE may suffer genuine difficulties and irreparable loss in presenting the meritorious matter before your honour on the facts as well as law.
And for this act of your kindness the appellant INSTITUTE shall remain ever pray and oblige.
Place : Cuttack |
By the Assessee Through A/R |
Date : 07/12/2018 |
CA CHANDRA SEKHAR MOHANTY. (A/R of the Assessee) |
3. Further the contents of affidavit filed by the assessee in this regard read as under :-
Before the Notary Public, Cuttack
AFFIDAVIT FOR THE CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL BEFORE THE INCOME-TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, CUTTACK BENCH, ODISHA.
In the matter of : |
REGIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION, BHUBANESWAR. Assessment Year : Asst Year-2009-10 |
Affidavit if Sri Pradip Kumar Rai aged about 48 (forty eight) years, son of Shri Narsingh Ra<$>, Permanent R/o:- Madhopur Dharang, Dist:- Ajomgarh, State-Utter Pradesh, At present R/o: Qtr No-3R-17|RIE Campus, Sachivalaya Marg, P.s.:- Sahid Nagar, Bhubaneswar-751022, section officer of REGIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION, BHUBANESWAR
I, the deponent abovenamed do hereby solemnly affirm and State on oath as under :
1. That the deponent is the section officer to Sri Prakash Chandra Agarwal, Principal of REGIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION, BHUBANESWAR, in the abovenoted case and as such he is well acquainted with the facts deposed to below.
2. That, the order of the C1T (Appeals)-l, Bhubaneswar passed on 04/10/2011 referring to the Order framed U/s 201(1) & 201 (1A) of the Income tax Act, 1961, by the AC1T, (TDS), Bhubaneswar was served on the appellant on 07/10/2011, hence the Second Appeal could have been made within a period of 60 (sixty) days from the date of receipt of the order as provided under the provisions of the IT act.
3. That, the Second appeal was filed by the appellant on 07/12/2018 caused delay of about 2554 Days which may be condoned in view of the condonation petition filed separately.
4. That, the Appellant has a prima facie case and the balance of convenience leans in favour of the Appellant.
5. That, to avoid repetition of facts the averments made in the petition for condonation of delay filed submitting the reasons along with the Second Appeal may be treated as a part and parcel of this affidavit.
6. That the Assessee in absence of proper legal advice could not take steps earlier and now in terms of the decision rendered by an appropriate Court of Law has filed the Appeal at a belated stage.
However, delay in filing appeal is bonafide. The genuine belief about the applicability of Rule-3 of Income Tax Rules, 1962 regarding the perquisite value of the accommodation provided by the appellant to its employees considering the status of the appellant at par with that of a Central Government department was not accepted by the Assessing Officer, ACIT (TDS), Bhubaneswar nor by the CIT (Appeals)-I, Bhubaneswar.
7. That the same issue was raised by Regional Institute of Education, Mysore on the question of fact that whether the employees of the appellant could be construed as the employees of the Central Government or any other State Government for the purpose of claiming the benefit of the perquisite value for un furnished accommodation, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) Mysore has construed the status of the appellant as a Central Government Organization for the purpose of calculation of perquisites and not as an autonomous body vide Order Dated 31/08/2017 (Certified copy of the order is filed). Therefore the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.
8. That the delay in filing the appeal is not intentional nor there has been any negligence on the part of the appellant in filling the present appeal. Since the appellant was not aware about the decision rendered by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Mysore which was based on decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the appeal could not be filed earlier. The judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court being binding on everybody, the technicalities like delay in preferring the appeal should not stand on the way to implement the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Hence the delay in preferring the appeal is bonafide and thus may kindly be condoned.
9. That there has been no negligence on the part of the appellants in filing the present appeal. Whatever delay has occurred, it has occurred on account of ignorance of law & in absence of a good legal advice by a counsel.
10. That the facts stated above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
I, the deponent above named do hereby declare that the contents of this affidavit are true to my personal knowledge; and are based on record and those of Paragraph No. 7 of the affidavit are based on information received; and those of Paragraph Nos. 8 & 9 of this affidavit are based on legal advice, which all 1 believe to be true that no Part of it is false and nothing material has been concealed in it.
Sd/-
Deponent
I, Shri Prakash Chandra Agarwal, Principal, REGIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION, BHUBANESWAR do hereby declare that the person making this affidavit and alleging himself to be the deponent in the name of person who is known to me personally as Section Officer of REGIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION, BHUBANESWAR
Sd/-
Principal
Solemnly affirmed before Sri BivashRanjan Panda (Advocate) on this the day of 24th Day of 2019 at about 11 A.M. by the deponent who has been identified by the aforesaid person.
I have satisfied myself by examining the deponent who has understood the contents of this affidavit and has been read over and explained to him by me.
Sd/-
Notary Public, "Cuttack
4. In addition to the above, ld. AR submitted that in absence of proper legal advice, the assessee could not file appeal earlier, therefore, prayed that delay occurred in filing the appeal may kindly be condoned and the appeal of the assessee may kindly be heard on merit.
5. On the other hand, ld. DR vehemently opposed to condone the huge delay in filing the appeal by the assessee and submitted that appeal of the assessee deserves to be dismissed on the delay ground only.
6. After hearing both the sides and perusing the condonation application along with affidavit filed by the assessee, we find that the appeal of the assessee is barred by 2554 days. In this regard, ld. AR in the application and affidavit has mentioned that the claim of the assessee for perquisite value of the accommodation provided by the assessee to its employees considering the status of the assessee at par with that of a Central Government Department, was rejected by the AO (TDS), Bhubaneswar. Thereafter in appellate proceedings, the CIT(A)-1, Bhubaneswar also upheld the action of AO vide order dated 04.10.2011. Against which the assessee would have to come in second appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal within a period of sixty days from the date on which the order sought to be appealed against is communicated to the assessee as prescribed in Section 253(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. However, the assessee waited for the decision of the similar issue pending before the CIT(A) Mysore, which was decided on 31.08.2017 construing the status of the assessee as a Central Government Organization for the purpose of valuation of perquisites and not as an autonomous body. Now, the assessee has filed the present appeal before this Tribunal with the above observations of the CIT(A), Mysore after a lapse of 2554 days. It is also a fact that the assessee-institute is a constituent unit of National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT), New Delhi. It is the responsibility of the concerned officer to deduct TDS from the perquisite value of rent free accommodation given to its employees in terms of Rule 3 of I.T.Rules, 1962, without waiting for the decision of CIT(A), Mysore which is not the jurisdiction of the present assessee. We are of the opinion that the grounds taken by the assessee for condonation of delay is not sufficient. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) By Lrs. Vs. Exe. Eng. Jalgaon Medium Project & Another, in Civil Appeal Nos.6414-6417 of 2008 (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.21011-21014 of 2007), order dated 3th November, 2008, has held that, “Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest.” The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are as under :-
“10. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions made during the course of hearing of these appeals.
11. Whether the respondent made incorrect statement in the application seeking condonation of delay?
There is no dispute whatsoever that the respondent being the beneficiary of the acquisition has been duly impleaded as a party respondent in the reference cases as is required in law. It not only appeared in the matter through a properly instructed counsel but also filed its written statement opposing the claim for enhancement of compensation but did not choose to lead any evidence whatsoever. In the application filed in the High Court the plea taken by the respondent is as under:
"The applicant submits that, although the applicant being Acquiring Body, was arrayed as opponent in the said reference, the opponent no. 4 herein (Original Opponent No. 1) S.L.A.O. or his subordinate contested the said reference by filing written statement. Therefore, this applicant was unaware about the stand taken by S.L.A.O. as well as the impugned judgment and award."
This averment in the application on the face of it is totally incorrect. The Law & Judiciary Department as early as on 13.4.2000 i.e. to say within the period of 15 days from the date of the award of the Reference Court communicated its decision to acquiesce in the decision of the Reference Court and communicated the same to all the concerned including the beneficiary of the acquisition. It is not the case that the Executive Engineer did not receive the said communication. Having received the said communication the respondent did not act in the matter and initiated any steps for filing the appeals if it was really aggrieved by the decision of the Reference Court. There is no doubt whatsoever in our mind that the respondent made totally incorrect statement in the application filed in the High Court. We express our reservation as to the manner in which a public authority conducted itself in its anxiety to somehow get the relief from the court. In our considered opinion incorrect statement made in the application seeking condonation of delay itself is sufficient to reject the application without any further inquiry as to whether the averments made in the application reveal sufficient cause to condone the delay. That a party taking a false stand to get rid of the bar of limitation should not be encouraged to get any premium on the falsehood on his part by condoning delay. [See: (1993)1SCC 572].
12. Whether the High Court properly exercised its discretion?
The High Court in its order having noticed the relevant fact in categorical terms held that there was no substance in the plea that it was unaware about the judgment and award passed by the Reference Court since it was a party before the Reference Court and contested the matter. The High Court also found that the decision of the Joint Secretary to acquiesce was communicated to the beneficiary of the acquisition and therefore, its plea about the unawareness of the award and decision taken by the Government cannot be accepted. The High Court in its order emphatically rejected the ground raised by the respondent in that regard. In such view of the matter can it be said that the High Court properly exercised its jurisdiction? It is true that the power to condone the delay rests with the court in which the application was filed beyond time and decide whether there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay and ordinarily the superior court may not interfere with such discretion even if some error is to be found in the discretion so exercised by the court but where there is no sufficient cause for condoning the delay but the delay was condoned, it is a case of discretion not being exercised judicially and the order becomes vulnerable and susceptible for its correction by the superior court. The High Court having found that the respondent in its application made incorrect submission that it had no knowledge of the award passed by the Reference Court ought to have refused to exercise its discretion. The High Court exercised its discretion on wrong principles. In that view of the matter we cannot sustain the exercise of discretion in the manner done by the High Court.
13. Whether the respondent had satisfied the court that it had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeals within the prescribed time?
Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides for extension of prescribed period of limitation in certain cases and confers jurisdiction upon the court to admit any application or any appeal after the prescribed period if it is satisfied that the appellant or applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring such appeal or application within the prescribed period.
14. In the present case the Reference Court passed the award under Section 18 of the Act on 09.03.2000. On 13.04.2000 itself the Government took decision not to prefer any appeal against the decree and award passed by the Reference Court and accordingly communicated its decision to all the concerned including the respondent. The Government vide its order dated 21.05.2001 refused to review its decision and accordingly informed the same to the respondent beneficiary of acquisition. The respondent beneficiary in its application seeking condonation of delay refers to the letter dated 19.11.2003 issued by the Secretary, Irrigation Department, directing it to obtain legal advice from an advocate to initiate appropriate proceedings. The respondent instead of acting in the matter once again had chosen to address S.L.A.O.vide letter dated 06.02.2004 with a request to challenge the impugned judgment and award of the Reference Court. The same request was made by repeating reminders upto 12.07.2004. On 18.05.2004, the respondent beneficiary addressed a letter to the Collector requesting him to direct the Land Acquisition Officer to prefer an appeal. This correspondence continued up to 21.06.2004. Thereafter, the application along with the appeal seeking condonation of delay was filed on 25th February, 2005.
The applicant having set the machinery in motion cannot abandon it to resume it after number of years because the authority with whom it had entered into correspondence did not heed to its request to file appeals.
The question is : Can the respondent/applicant in this case take advantage of its negligence, after lapse of number of years, of the decision of Government? It knew the exact grounds on which appeals could have been preferred. The law will presume that it knew of its right to file appeal against the award. Everybody is presumed to know law. It was its duty to prefer appeals before the court for consideration which it did not. There is no explanation forthcoming in this regard. The evidence on record suggest neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and `do not slumber over their rights.' The question for consideration is whether the averments disclosed any sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay of 1724 days in filing the appeals.
15. In Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and anr. vs. State of Gujarat [ (1981) 1 SCC 495 ] this court observed :
"It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute sufficient cause." (Emphasis supplied) This judgment squarely applies to the facts in hand.
17. The respondent beneficiary of the acquisition did not initiate any steps whatsoever before expiry of limitation and no circumstances are placed before the court that steps were taken to file appeals but it was not possible to file the appeals within time.
18. Shri Mohta, learned senior counsel relying on the decision of this court in N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123] submitted that length of delay is no matter, acceptability of explanation is the only criterion. It was submitted that if the explanation offered does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of dilatory tactics the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. The very said decision upon which reliance has been placed holds that the law of limitation fixes a life span for every legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury suffered. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of Limitation is thus founded on public policy. The decision does not lay down that a lethargic litigant can leisurely choose his own time in preferring appeal or application as the case may be. On the other hand, in the said judgment it is said that court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It is observed:
"It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium ( it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time."
19. In Ramlal and others vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [ AIR 1962 SC 361], this court held that: "in construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause of excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone the delay and admit the appeal. `It is further necessary to emphasis that even if the sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by section 5. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage the diligence of the party of its bona fides may fall for consideration." On the facts and in the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the respondent beneficiary was not diligent in availing the remedy of appeal. The averments made in the application seeking condonation of delay in filing appeals do not show any acceptable cause much less sufficient cause to exercise courts' discretion in its favour.
20. Learned senior counsel for the respondent also placed reliance upon the decision of this court in Union of India vs. Sube Ram and others [ (1997) 9 SCC 69]. This court condoned delay of 3379 days in preferring the appeals by Special Leave. The said decision is mostly confined to the facts of that case and does not lay down any law as such requiring us to make any further analysis of the judgment.
21. Submissions based on public interest and involvement of public money:
The learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the decision of this court in Union of India vs. Balbir Singh and ors. [2000 (10)SCC 611] in support of his submission that the courts should be liberal in condoning the delay particularly whenever public interest and public money is involved. All that the said decision states is that in the circumstances of the case the court was inclined to condone the delay, particularly, "because it is in the public interest as public money is involved." The facts are not evident from the judgment and as to what were those public interest parameters that were taken into consideration to condone the delay in filing appeals.
22. Basically the laws of Limitation are founded on public policy. In Halsbury's Laws of England,4th Ed., Vol.28,p.266,para 605, the policy of the Limitation Acts is laid down as follows:
"The courts have expressed at least three different reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation, namely,(i) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (ii) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to dispute the stated claim, (iii) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence."
23. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as `statutes of peace'. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. This court in Rajender Singh and others vs. Santa Singh and others [(1973) 2 SCC 705] has observed : "the object of law of Limitation is to prevent disturbance and deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches". In Motichand vs. Munshi [(1969) 2 SCR 824], this court observed that this principle is based on the maxim "interest republicae ut sit finis litum, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time law of Limitation are a means to ensuring private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression.
It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a life span for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.
24. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner sub-serves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the land loosers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy.
Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit which otherwise not entitled in law in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the land loosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Dragging the land loosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest.
25. It is true when the State and its instrumentalities are the applicants seeking condonation of delay they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same for citizen and for Governmental authorities. Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the government in filing appeals or applications as such. It would be a different matter where the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In a given case if any such facts are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from consideration and those factors may go into the judicial verdict. In the present case, no such facts are pleaded and proved though a feeble attempt by the learned counsel for the respondent was made to suggest collusion and fraud but without any basis. We cannot entertain the submission made across the Bar without there being any proper foundation in the pleadings.
26. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the High Court gravely erred and exercised its discretion to condone the inordinate delay of 1724 days though no sufficient cause has been shown by the applicants. It is for that reason, we interfere with the decision of the High Court and set aside the same. The appeals are accordingly allowed without any orders as to costs.
Respectfully following the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case cited supra, we are of the opinion that, the delay of 2554 days in filing the present appeal by the assessee cannot be condoned. Accordingly, we dismiss the application for condonation of delay filed by the assessee and consequently, appeal of the assessee is also dismissed on the ground of delay.
7. In the result, appeal of the assessee is dismissed.
Order pronounced in the open court on 21/01/2020.
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